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

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TRANSLATION

TITLE: ON THE SITUATION IN THE [illegible]
ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
FROM JULY 1968 TO AUGUST 1969

AUTHOR: AUTHOR IDENTIFIED ONLY AS PL

TRANSLATED BY: [illegible]

ON THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST:
FLEET ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN:
SUMMARY FROM JULY 1980 to AUGUST 1982

[Author identified only as PL; Zur Lage im Mittleren Osten: Flottenaktivataeten in Indischen Ozean; Ueberblick vom Juli 1980 bis August 1982; Oesterr. Milit. Zeitschrift, No. 1 (1983); pp. 48-55; German]

In this time period, maritime activities developed one on top of the other, /48* and, on the one hand, included actions and presence of naval forces of the Soviet Union and of the US, including an additional British presence, and, on the other, activities of French and Australian naval units and finally, also maritime activities of the adjacent states of a demonstrational nature, as for example, by the Indian Navy, as well as combat actions like those of the Iranian and Iraqi naval forces. Fleet activities were determined mainly by:

--the Iranian-American hostage conflict until its conclusion in late January 1981;

--the inclusion especially of the Arabian Gulf in the sea areas of direct American interests, as expressed by a maritime presence;

--the Soviet policy of presence in this area and the measures to obtain or to expand bases and anchorages;

--the importance of the Persian Gulf for supplying Europe and Japan with petroleum;

--the American actions for safeguarding the logistics of operations of forces of the "Rapid Deployment Force" in the area of vital interests of the USA;

--the military conflict between Iran and Iraq since September 1980, and

--the political development in the states bordering the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, and their actions to look after their maritime interests, including the claim of sovereignty in the 200-mile zone soon to enter into force.

Early in July 1980, the American naval forces in the Indian Ocean included 21 surface combatants in two carrier task forces formed around the carriers D. D. EISENHOWER and CONSTELLATION.[1] In addition there was a small task force, stationed in the Persian Gulf as the Middle East Force, which consisted of one command ship and two destroyers and/or frigates. Ten auxiliary and replenishment ships or fleet tankers formed the floating logistical base of the American naval forces.[2]

On the night of 26 June 1980, the carrier CONSTELLATION collided with the freighter BANGLAYR JOY, but remained in operation with minor damage. On 7 July 1980 the Sixth Amphibious Transport Unit (ATU) departed the Mediterranean with the helicopter carrier GUADALCANAL, the LPD NASHVILLE, and the LSD PENSACOLA, and two tank landing ships (LST 1194, 1197) for the Red Sea and on to the Indian Ocean. By 8 August this task force returned to the Mediterranean, but it underscored the American readiness to dispatch even Marines, if need be,

*Numbers in right margin indicate pagination in the original text.

quickly into the Indian Ocean. At this time also the widening of the Suez Canal was completed in late July 1980, so that now American and Soviet aircraft carriers (excluding nuclear-powered carriers) were able to transit this communications link. This consequently made the exchange of American carriers easier and permits rapid reinforcement from the Mediterranean, assuming an appropriate stance on the part of Egypt.

On 22 August 1980 a treaty was concluded between the USA and Somalia which granted the American fleet port rights in Berbera and Mogadishu. Concurrently, the USA was bound to expand those ports and to supply weapons in the amount of 42 million dollars. Here, especially the port of Berbera, located at the entrance to the Red Sea and about midway between Socotra Island and the Yemeni port of Aden, has special importance. However, the delivery of armaments by the United States was not started for the time being.

The American carrier task force with CONSTELLATION was supposed to be relieved by a task force with MIDWAY. The approach was delayed by a collision of the carrier on 29 July 1980 with a freighter. The MIDWAY Task Force with its escort forces[3] and the tanker MISPILLION then on 18 August entered the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca. CONSTELLATION returned to San Diego a few days later. A battalion task force of Marines aboard the helicopter carrier NEW ORLEANS, the LPD VANCOUVER, and two tank landing ships (LST 1184 and 1191) on 8 August passed through the Strait of Malacca and remained in the Indian Ocean until mid-October.

In October 1980, the American presence was reinforced to a total of 37 units, while simultaneously the Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf was reinforced to combat strength, and besides the command ship LASALLE included the guided missile cruiser LEAHY, the destroyer PETERSON of the modern SPRUANCE Class, and two frigates (1047, 1092). After a brief call in Perth, a relieving carrier task force with RANGER, the guided missile cruiser GOLDSBOROUGH, two frigates (1070, 1077), and the tanker PASSUMPSIC entered the Indian Ocean on 30 October, whereupon the MIDWAY Task Force was again transferred back to its base in Yokosuka (Japan). By 28 October, the 34th Battalion Task Force of Marines on the modern helicopter carrier SAIPAN with a cargo ship (LKA 117) and a tank landing ship (LST 1179) had cruised in via the Suez Canal and then remained in the Indian Ocean until December 1980. In early December, the EISENHOWER Task Force was finally relieved by the task force with INDEPENDENCE, at which time the two task forces sailed around the Cape of Good Hope. The EISENHOWER Task Force had been at sea a total of 251 days.

Late in 1980 there was another employment of an amphibious task force of the Pacific Fleet with the Marine 31st Battalion Task Force and the helicopter carrier TARAWA and of an amphibious cargo ship (LKA 116) and a tank landing ship (LSR 1195).

The logistics problems for the American carrier task forces in the Arabian Sea proved serious. Since there were only a few refineries available on the Persian Gulf itself and the fuels needed for aircraft and ships were not being produced there, replenishment was by tanker. Stores, spare parts, and similar items were flown from near San Francisco to Diego Garcia with C-5 and C-141 transport aircraft. From there, supply flights to the carriers were conducted with C-1s and C-2s, whose range was only 2000 km; the carriers had to leave their

operations area to go to meet them. In order to maintain the regular presence of two carrier task forces in the Indian Ocean, occasional reductions to only one carrier task force, therefore, had to be made in the Mediterranean and in the West Pacific.

The American carrier task forces were relayed in the Arabian Sea, and they /49 were augmented by surveillance flights with P-3 ORIONs from Diego Garcia. All in all, however, unfavorable conditions prevailed for that purpose, since, in view of a distance of around 3400 km from Diego Garcia to the Strait of Hormuz and a surveillance distance of around 1200 km in the Persian Gulf, those aircraft had to make intermediate landings in Masira (Oman) or Bahrein or remain available for the actual surveillance operations for only a brief time. The crews became overfatigued in the process, so that a possible in-flight refueling would not have brought about any serious improvement.



The American carrier MIDWAY (CV-61) during a visit in Singapore. Aircraft carriers are the nucleus of the American naval presence also in the Indian Ocean.

In like manner the conditions in the Gulf of Oman were also occasionally unfavorable for sonar monitoring of combatants, and the employment of passive sonars in the presence of sometimes 60 to 100 tankers and freighters was of little value. The high temperatures and the general climatic conditions in the Gulf of Oman and in the Persian Gulf fatigued the crews of the ships and the aircraft, and in addition during the monsoon season from June to October, there were difficult conditions for air operations. Helicopter operations from destroyers were especially impaired during that time.[4]

For maintenance work on the units employed, one each repair ship and one destroyer tender remained stationed for about six months in Diego Garcia.[5]

Since 19 May there was one British task force with the cruiser ANTRIM, the destroyer COVENTRY, the frigates GALATHEA, NAIAD, and ALACRITY, and three replenishment ships[6] in the Far East, where they put into Yokohama and Shanghai, besides other ports. In September 1980, the destroyer COVENTRY was dispatched to the Persian Gulf in a demonstration of British interests, while the rest of the units deployed from Hong Kong to the Indian Ocean in early October. Then the BEACON COMPASS naval maneuvers were held with the American task forces in the Gulf of Oman from 21 October to 4 November, before the British task force was then deployed to the Mediterranean in early December. At that time the result was the greatest ever maritime concentration of naval forces not regularly homeported in the Indian Ocean, with 37 American, 14 French, 29 Soviet,

8 British, and 5 Australian combatant and replenishment ships[7] which at the same time marked the peak of the demonstration actions in the Iranian-American hostage conflict.

That conflict ended on 20 January 1981 with the release of the hostages by Iran and therefore the removal of the direct cause of the tensions and of the heightened maritime presence.

However, the Indian Ocean remained a sea area of strategic interest for the USA, where, besides the counterbalancing of the Soviet presence by demonstrations, primarily the protection of the petroleum shipments and the support of the states adjacent to this area and friendly to the USA was paramount.

Consequently, the TARAWA task force on 18 February 1981 departed the Indian Ocean as the first sign of a lessening of tensions and returned to San Diego; early in March the RANGER task force visited the port of Colombo and on 12 March departed the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca for Hong Kong. The relieving task force from Yokosuka with the carrier MIDWAY entered the Strait of Malacca on that date.[8]

Therefore, by May 1981 two American task forces with MIDWAY and INDEPENDENCE still remained in the Indian Ocean, where first MIDWAY returned to her Japanese base and INDEPENDENCE departed the operations area through the Suez Canal in May 1981. AMERICA from the Atlantic Fleet and KITTY HAWK from the US 7th Fleet came as replacements.[9] Then starting in October 1981 the relieving CORAL SEA task force was left alone in the Indian Ocean.

Consequently, the US Navy held to a system whereby the employed carriers[10] would be provided alternately by the Atlantic and the Pacific fleets in each case. In crisis situations, a reinforcement force can be available from the Mediterranean within five days, and there were consequently also two carrier task forces together in the Indian Ocean in the relief phases. This arrangement reduced the strain on the carriers, and in the Mediterranean again permitted the stationing of two aircraft carriers and the scheduled conduct of the overhaul and modernization programs. The strategic alternating between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean was especially clear in 1982 during the crisis in Lebanon, when the carrier INDEPENDENCE dispatched to the Indian Ocean in relief of RANGER was redeployed in a short time through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean at the height of the crisis and provided an important reinforcement of the American combat capability available there, while RANGER remained temporarily in her then operations area.

In March 1981, a five-year plan for the expansion of bases in the Indian Ocean as well as in the accesses to the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea was approved by the American government. According to the plan Diego Garcia Island is to be built up further and the opportunities contained in the agreement with Somalia, Oman, Kenya, and Egypt were to be exploited.

Diego Garcia Island is horshoe-shaped with an overall diameter of about 8 km and a length of 25 km, the width averaging 400 to 500 m. The island is especially wet and has a port which offers berthing for ships drawing up to 16 m. The nearly 4-km-long airfield is adequate for C-54s and the P-3 ORION and is being improved so that even B-52s can take off. The living quarters accommodate about 1800 men, and the fuel depot has a capacity of 640,000 barrels. Under a British-American treaty, Diego Garcia is a joint defense area, but it is also claimed by Mauritius. Diego Garcia is being further built up as a base.

Somalian Berbera and Mogadishu as well as Mombasa in Kenya are geing entered periodically by American ships. Berbera's port facilities and shipyard are to be developed intensively. The structures begun and the infrastructure established with Russian support are being used or incorporated.

The British fleet itself has barely maintained a regular presence in the Indian Ocean with two frigates, and those units are relieved in each case after a tour of usually many months' duration.

Diego Garcia was turned into a port for material and supplies for the rapid /50 deployment troops since July 1980. To begin with, the equipment for the around 12,000-man 7th Brigade Task Force of Marines arrived on seven ships[11] including ammunition for 15 days of combat and ammunition and spare parts for 12 Air Force fighter bomber squadrons.

Those fighter bomber squadrons are supposed to be flown in within 12 days in an emergency, and air refueling has been readied for that purpose. The SEALIFT PACIFIC tanker employed originally is being relieved in 90-day cycles by another SEALIFT tanker. The civilian crews of the depot ships are being flown in with aircraft, and are being relieved in that manner. The committed mobile logistics ships are equipped with dehumidifier installations, so that after around seven months the mobile logistics ship MERCURY went to Okinawa and there with few exceptions all the M-60 tanks and vehicles were able to leave the ship under their own power. After completion of material maintenance, MERCURY returned to Diego Garcia.

Diego Garcia, supply base of the United States Navy

In the course of the year 1981, measures for creating a mobile logistics fleet for a total of three brigade task forces and preparing supplies for 30 days were resolutely pursued. Thus in 1981 a total of 13 ships were purchased[13], including 6 SL-7 Sea-Land fast freighters, which are each capable of carrying 1968 containers at 33 kn. Those units are suitable for rapid transport into crisis areas, and could, for example, sail from Wilmington to the Persian Gulf via the Suez Canal in 10 days. By way of comparison for example the ships from Diego Garcia take 6 days at 15 kn to the Strait of Hormuz, and 4.5 days at 20 kn. In November 1981 then an additional six mobile logistics ships were deployed to San Diego, where they stocked ammunition and material for the 7th Brigade Task Force for a total of 30 days of combat and provided additional material for fighter bomber squadrons and units of the US Army. In 1982 finally two more SL--7 fast freighters and the German Ro/Ro ship RABENFELS [14] were purchased, and opportunities for the employment of FINNJET-Class ferries were examined.[15]

All in all in 1982 all the medium-term decisions necessary for building up the mobile logistics fleet were taken. Accordingly, basically no new ships are being built for the logistics fleet, but purchases will be made. In addition, two ships are to be converted to hospital ships, and the T-AO 187-Class fleet tankers are to be built up to 19 units. Two forward area supply ships of the British Navy[16] and the two remaining Ro/Ro units of the MAINE Class are being purchased. The SL-7 fast freighters are being given Ro/Ro equipment and are thus being greatly improved in their operational value.

The first test of the operational and tactical capabilities of the rapid deployment troops occurred on 14 to 18 November 1982 during the BRIGHT STAR 82 maneuvers, when elements of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division and of the 82nd Airborne Division were committed. In the Sudan and in Somalia it came down to exercises of very small scale, which had a primarily political nature and less military significance. On 6 December, however, an American battalion task force with around 1000 men reinforced by a weak British contingent landed at Salalah on the coast of Muscat, and about 30 hr after the landing and a very pointed cooperation with Omani forces it returned aboard the amphibious combat and transport ships.

All in all the Indian Ocean continues to ahve great significance for the USA which is underscored by the logically pursued measures of maritime presence, base policy, preparation of equipment and supplies for the deployment forces, and the occasional exercises of elements of the rapid deployment force in that area. There is only very little information on the operation of nuclear-powered missile submarines of the United States Navy in this sea area. To some extent, however, up to five such units have probably been in the Indian Ocean.

Besides the American naval forces there were also Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean in this period which were committed to meet the politico-strategic situation primarily as politically effective demonstrations of strength and to monitor the American carrier task forces in the Arabian Sea and in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz. In early July 1980 the Soviet task force, distributed over the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Oman, included 10 surface combatants and a few submarines. Besides two KRESTA-Class missile cruisers, three destroyers and/or frigates, there were two minehunters, the dock landing ship IVAN ROGOV, and a large landing ship in the operation. Three tankers and several repair and supply ships provided the logistic support for the operation, while several intelligence collection and research ships distributed over the entire Indian Ocean area probably conducted reconnaissance.[18]

Most of the Soviet units were provided by the Pacific Fleet, and a smaller part, by the Black Sea Fleet, and also now and then by the Baltic Fleet. The approach from the Sea of Japan is about 11,000 km, and from the Black Sea via the Suez Canal, it is 7000 km. Those distances subsequently required a stay of the surface combatants in the Indian Ocean of over six months.

Generally, the Soviet units demonstrated a tendency during their periods of operation toward long layoffs off Dhalak or Socotra Islands, interrupted only occasionally by random cruises to the Gulf of Aden and into the Seychelles sea area, around Madagascar and off Mozambique, small-scale exercises in the Gulf of Aden, periods of observation in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, port visits to Ibouti, Aden, Maputo, Bombay, Colombo, as well as ports in Sri Lanka, the Seychelles, or Mauiritius. Frequently those port visits were in

conjunction with the deployment of the units involved to or from their parent fleets.

In August 1980 there was a Soviet task force with one KRESTA-Class cruiser and one tanker in the sea area off Mozambique, and after a visit to Beira the unit returned to the Gulf of Aden in September after exercises with the replenishment ship BEREZINA.

Between 10 and 19 September a Soviet unit with the dock landing ship IVAN ROGOV, the KRIVAK-Class STOROZHEVOY, and one submarine[20] visited the port of Massaua. Previously, amphibious exercises of IVAN ROGOV and one ALLIGATOR-Class LST had been held off the coast of Yemen. IVAN ROGOV then returned to the Pacific to be prepared for the return in 1981 to the Baltic in extensive docking period.

In September 1980 there was also a demonstrational employment of a Soviet task force of the Pacific Fleet with the aircraft carrier MINSK and three escorts (destroyer and frigates) in the sea area off Vietnam and in the Gulf of Siam. The aircraft carrier sailed from Cam Ranh to the Gulf of Siam, operated there in a manner similar to that of American carrier groups and then counter to expec- /51 tation, returned to the sea of Japan without redeploying at least briefly to the Indian Ocean.[21]

From 16 to 19 October a Soviet task force en route to the Pacific visited the Indian port of Cochin. It included[22] the KRESTA-Class cruiser VLADIVOSTOK, the KASHIN-Class destroyer ODARENNY, and the tanker PECHENGA. Shortly before, the hospital ship OB[23] built at the Polish shipyard in Stettin transited the Indian Ocean while deploying to the Far East.

In December 1980, the strength of the Soviet task force dropped to an average of seven to eight surface ships, including the SVERDLOV-Class cruiser ADMIRAL SUVAROV dispatched from the Pacific. The mainly four frigates and destroyers were predominantly of the KRIVAK and KOTLIN Classes, but now and then KASHIN-Class destroyers were also employed. With the end of the Iranian-American hostage crisis in late January 1981, there was a reduction in the Soviet monitoring operations, and a slow reduction in the number of committed ships, so that in the spring of 1981 there were mostly only five to eight surface combatants available. In May 1981, one SVERDLOV cruiser, two destroyers, two frigates, two tank landing ships, four submarines, 11 replenishment ships, two intelligence collection ships and four auxiliaries formed the Soviet task force.[24] Thereafter, the strength slowly dropped.

In late February 1981, the cruiser ADMIRAL SUVAROV with destroyer ODARENNY and tanker MAPUTO visited the ports of Beira and Port Louis. The cruiser and one KOTLIN destroyer entered Aden in May 1981, and then in late July the cruiser with one KRIVAK frigate redeployed to the Sea of Japan.[26] The Soviet fleet also operated nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean, mainly of the ECHO and the CHARLIE Classes. To be sure, there were generally no more than a maximum of four such units in this sea area at the same time.

In late September, the KRESTA-Class missile cruiser SEVASTOPOL and one supply ship visited the port of Port Victoria in the Seychelles. Shortly afterward the KARA-Class missile cruiser TALLIN built in the Baltic in company with one KRIVAK frigate and one escort ship entered the Indian Ocean and, after the usual port visit in Maputo, continued on to the Gulf of Aden. Those units were deploying

to the Pacific Fleet and also had to conduct a presence mission in the Indian Ocean which lasted about six months. At about the same time of the task force visit, a floating dock was delivered to Mozambique in accordance with an agreement between the USSR and Mozambique on the expansion of the repair capacity of that port. The dock[28] was assembled by Soviet personnel and in April 1982 began repair and maintenance work.



KARA-Class cruisers deployed to the Indian Ocean

Owing to the greatly reduced overall strength in surface combatants, in late 1981 and early 1982 only a few port visits and rather long cruising periods were carried out. Finally, an average of four to five surface units were left in the operations area, where about three supply and auxiliary ships can be counted on for each combatant. Cruiser TALLIN and the KRIVAK frigate REVNOSTNYY departed the Indian Ocean in April 1982[29] and were relieved by the KRESTA cruiser ADMIRAL CHAPAYEV and the KRIVAK frigate RYANYY. On 12 May 1982 that task force conducted the last rather large fleet visit to Port Victoria in the Syechelles before the intensification of the internal political situation in that island group.[30]

The climatic and the specific conditions of the Indian Ocean, for example, the prevailing long swell, have presumably caused heavy stress of the crews and wear and tear of the equipment and electronics of the Soviet warships. Since the Soviet units were generally not designed for long deployments under such conditions, those factors probably play a considerable role. This was also expressed in angry remarks of outward-bound crews, which perhaps during the transit of the Turkish Straits got to the outside via bottle post.[31] Also, opinions on the engineering quality of the Soviet units sold to other navies with subtropical operating conditions allow of such conclusions.[32] Another indication of the wear and tear are the long dock times of the units returning from operational cruises to the shipyards of their home bases[33] as well as the discoveries of accidents on nuclear submarines and of the jeopardy to the crews.

The logistics base of the Soviet task forces in the Indian Ocean and in the Red Sea was formed primarily by the bases and facilities on Dhalak and Socotra Islands and in Aden.

The Dhalak Island group, about 50 km east of the port of Massaua and controling the approaches to it, was developed as the most important logistics base, despite the unfavorable climatic conditions. It serves as an anchorage for the units coming from the Mediterranean or departing for it, a supply base, and provides maintenance for the units. To that end the floating dock was towed there from the port of Berbera, which was no longer available. Five auxiliaries mainly formed

Replenishment ship BEREZINA delivering oil at sea

the nucleus of the infrastructure, and included one AMUR-Class repair ship, one /52 DON-Class tender, one to two smaller tenders, and one to two tugs.

Oman, a small state on a strategically important point, the Strait of Hormuz: surveillance with small combatants



Socotra Island, in a favorable naval strategic position off the Gulf of Aden and lying off the Horn of Africa, has no developed ports, and serves primarily as an anchorage. Two rather small airfields permit supply and communication. The port of Aden is at this time suitable only as an anchorage and for supply, and no longer offers any efficient repair facilities. South Yemen, already since 1972 following a course in its politics accommodating the Soviet Union, had decided on 27 November 1980 to assume observer status in the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON and to favor the Soviet Union by going beyond the 1979 treaty. At about the same time therefore began the systematic delivery of Soviet equipment and war material to the army, the navy, and air force of South Yemen and the expansion or new construction of military bases and airfields at least with Soviet advisers.[35]

Thus four missile bases for not further identified missiles were set up on the northwestern border with North Yemen between Mansura and Al-Sakya for action

toward the Red Sea. In addition, the Khormaksar airfield near Aden was modernized and provided with command facilities. These measures on the Yemeni airfields are presumably to be made to meet the requirements for the air transport of Soviet airborne units among others. A new air force base is being set up near Lahaj, and the airfield and port of Mukalla are being developed. Also, a military training center is being created near Al-Ma-Ala with Soviet assistance. About 200 South Yemen military aircraft are being flown and maintained by Soviet or Cuban personnel.

Aden, a former British base, is today an important anchorage for Soviet warships

The port of Aden is to receive modern repair facilities and thus become useful as a naval base in the true sense. Similar measures are probably planned for Socotra, too; her inhabitants are to be evacuated or some already have been. This intensive Soviet support was finally affirmed also politically in the spring of 1982 by the signing of an aid pact between South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya following up on the friendship and cooperation treaty of 1979 with the Soviet Union.[36]

All in all the Soviet efforts to date by themselves still do not make possible any serious strengthening of the supply of combat units at these bases and their facilities. Rather, civilian tankers, fleet tankers of older classes, and now and then modern fleet replenishment ships are used here, now as before. To be sure, only a small portion of the Soviet replenishment ships have modern transfer rigs for beam refueling. Therefore, methods are still being used whereby the receiving warships must anchor or sail at a speed of from 4 to a maximum of 15 kn astern or abreast of the tanker at an interval of 30 to 70 m. In that way, for example, a tanker of the frequently employed KAZBEK Class receives a delivery of from 300 to 350 t per hr.

Usually the Soviet fleet tankers have two each transfer stations (with two hoses) at the sides and one stern station. Only six UDA-Class tankers, three KAZBEK-Class and a total of six of the PEVEK, OLEKMA, POLYARNIK, and FEOLENT Classes have that equipment. Modern fleet replenishment ships with modern transfer rigs for beam transfer at sea have been available however only since 1971, starting with six ships of the BORIS CHILIKIN Class, two MANYCH-Class replenishment ships, and four DUBNA-Class units. The only fleet replenishment ship of

BEREZINA Class, which has so far served only one operational tour in the Indian Ocean apparently as a trial, despite her 22,000-dwt capacity has only three transfer stations for fuel, four for general cargo, and a vertical replenishment capability with two onboard helicopters.[37]

Regarding the amount of fuel carried by the BEREZINA, the fuel supply of a KRESTA-Class cruiser of 1150 t can serve as an indication. That is enough for a range of about 12,500 km at 14 kn and 2700 km at the maximum speed of 32 kn, therefore just about enough for the distance from Socotra to the Persian Gulf with a least cruising time of 45 hr. This explains the ratio mentioned earlier between the committed replenishment ships and the units to be replenished and the relatively limited cruising activity.

There was a certain restraint to be observed in the Soviet task force in 1981-82, which dispensed with direct presence missions in the Persian Gulf. All ~~in all, the established goals were probably met, even if under considerable~~ material stress and strain of the Pacific Fleet. However, the occasionally mentioned naval stragegic goals in a conflict, perhaps the disruption of the tanker routes or amphibious intervention, could not be prosecuted with the generally available forces in relation to the American forces without additional support (possibly Tu-26s from the southern Soviet Union). Moreover, also the dimension of the Indian Ocean and the distance factor must be regarded as considerable in such conflicts and taken into account in comparisons.

Besides the two great maritime powers, France, Australia, South Africa, and India pursued naval strategic goals, and underscored them with maritime actions.

France maintained a group of minehunting and minesweeping ships in Djibouti, /53 which could be available if need be for sweeping missions in the Strait of Hormuz, which is important for tanker traffic.[38] Moreover, there were frigates or destroyers in that area which were rotated mostly after four months. Thus in early July 1982, the frigate GEORGES LEYGUES returned to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal after being relieved by the destroyer LA GALISSONIERE. Then in the fall two minehunters and three minesweeper boats[39] deployed to Djibouti as reinforcements, followed in order by the destroyers or frigates SUFFREN, ADMIRAL CHARNER, BOUVET, KERSAINT, DOUQUESNE, DESTIENNE D'ORVES, DU CHAYLA, and QUARTIER MAITRE ANQUETIL by spring 1982.

In addition, from 18 November 1980 to 30 April 1981 there was a training ship formation of the French Navy with training cruiser JEANNE D'ARC and destroyer FORBIN on a training cruise predominantly in the Indian Ocean, during which the ports of Djibouti, Colombo, and Bombay and several ports in the Far East were visited.

In the summer of 1980, in conjunction with the American-Iranian conflict, the Australian Navy intensified its action in the direction of the Indian Ocean by activating the West Australian base at Cockburn Sound, and stationed the missile destroyer BRISBANE at that base. In August the destroyer PERTH and the frigate DERWENT then relieved BRISBANE.

In November 1980 there was then a cruise by an Australian task force with the carrier MELBOURNE[41] as the nucleus into the central part of the Mediterranean, as a sign of Australian interest and her readiness to contribute to safeguarding the stability of the area. Consequently, hwoever, the bulk of the Australian maritime forces were on the southeastern and eastern coasts of the continent while reducing the continued presence in western Australian waters. But still



The People's Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) is an important part of Soviet basing policy on the Indian Ocean and with respect to the petroleum region of the Middle East. Out of the Mukalla/Riyan air base base Il-38s fly reconnaissance over the Strait of Hormuz, and, in the south, control of the Strait of Bab el Mandeb is in Aden.

a. Airfields b. Airfields used by Soviets c. Soviet airfields under construction d. Soviet naval base e. Soviet AA missile positions

but still efforts were introduced to improve the striking power by acquiring modern missile frigates of the American FFG-7 Class and purchasing the light aircraft carrier *INVINCIBLE from the British* Navy. The latter step was postponed for at least a rather long time by the Falkland Islands conflict.

In March 1980 the South African Navy had opened up the new deep-water basin of the Simonstown naval base and at the same time introduced six new missile boats of the MINISTER Class, which were able to be regarded as a clear sign of new maritime terms of reference for South Africa. Those units, derived from the Israeli RESHEF Class, are to be available in 24 copies, while no new frigates are to be built. The South African Navy is cutting back its missions in protecting the coast in the 200-mile zone and port defense on land. Now and then, operations beyond the 200-mile zone are not precluded; notwithstanding, a conversion to a small combatant fleet is being completed.

The fast patrol boats stationed in Simonstown and Durban, with a radius of action of 1800 km, can reach the southern exit of Mozambique Channel, but, if there is a medium sea, they have only a limited capability. There are still three submarines in service, and the remaining frigates are being phased out by 1986 at the latest. Moreover, on 18 February 1982 the frigate PRESIDENT KRUEGER collided in a high sea with the supply ship TAFELBERG while on a training cruise and was lost.

The events in Afghanistan, in Iran, and the subsequent increasing maritime presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean resulted in a definite switch in India's naval strategy. Thus the measures already introduced to some degree to modernize and strengthen the Indian Navy were continued with greater intensity and expanded. In the process, in addition to the naval bases of Bombay and Visakhapatnam, the ports of Cochin, Tuticorin or Madras are to be developed for naval purposes.

In addition, a naval building program is being continued and executed which will involve a third unit besides the KASHIN-Class destroyers delivered to date and a specifically Indian frigate building program. On 15 October 1981 the frigate GANGA, the type ship of that class and a purely Indian design, was launched in Bombay, a mix of British and Soviet features. To add to the eight existing Soviet F-Class submarines, in late 1982 two medium submarines were ordered from the Howaldt-Deutsch Shipyard, while two more are to be built under license in India. Negotiations are underway with other shipyards in Sweden and Italy for additional submarine deliveries.

The aircraft carrier VIKRANT was extensively modernized and fitted with eight SEA HARRIERs in late 1981. In addition, the hull was strengthened, a VTOL ramp was installed, the command and control installations and the sonar and radar were improved and in addition the ALIZE aircraft were modified. Besides, one SEA KING helicopter and two CHETAKs are being accommodated. Additionally, India intends to undertake the development and the later construction of a sea control ship, which is to be equipped with SEA HARRIERS.

To protect her interests in the 200-mile zone, a sea frontier force was created which received two rather old frigates. Their 114-mm guns were replaced with STYX missiles, thus providing an improved range. Ocean surveillance continues to be flown with three formerly Soviet Il-38s.

In late March 1982, Soviet defense minister Ustinov was in India and inspected the Bombay naval base among other things. Then from 5 May 1982 there was an Indian naval formation with two destroyers and one submarine on an official naval visit in Saigon.

Finally, in July 1982, Indian naval maneuvers were held in the Arabian Sea in which the modernized aircraft carrier VIKRANT took part, and they were observed by the large number of leading Indian politicians aboard the units. This must be assessed as a singular expression of India's intention to protect her strategic interests in that sea area. However, at nearly the same time India had promoted the supply of goods and increased shipping to India, while non-Indian capital was invited to invest in India, and a greater readiness to accommodation was being demonstrated.

However, in late summer 1980, besides the American-Iranian hostage conflict, /54 there began a military conflict between Iran and Iraq, which in this so sensitive region on the Persian Gulf took on a significance extending beyond the directly involved area.

On 6 August 1980 there was a meeting between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and King Khaled of Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Fahd in Taef. The rapprochement between the two states reached there and the promised Saudi Arabian economic aid for Iraq created the conditions for the subsequent military action by Iraq at Shatt-el-Arab, which began on 17 August. The maritime combat actions in the area of Shatt-el-Arab and the deep-water loading stations for oil tankers on Kharg Island and in Kar-el-Amaya have already been reported.[42]

At first there were actions between fast patrol boats and small combatants in narrow waters. On 21 August the sinking of three Iranian small combatants by Iraqi gunfire and of other units by Iraqi patrol boats was announced. On 24 August Iranian forces, including two frigates, took Iraqi positions near Basrah and Fao under fire. In the sharp naval actions which followed, successes were reported by both sides, but on 27 August 1980 Iran admitted the loss of two small combatants and one minehunter.

The battles at sea between Iraqi and Iranian combat units in 1981 remained low in intensity, and allowed of no concrete assessment, owing to the differences in the accounts. Worthy of mention in this respect is only the alleged sinking of an Iranian fast patrol boat of the KAMAN Class by an AM-39 EXOCET missile said to have been fired from an Iraqi FRELON helicopter. This would be the first sinking of a warship by a helicopter.

On 25 October 1981 the multi-purpose freighter IRAN REZVAN was sunk off Bandar Khomeiny by an Iraqi missile attack, thus involving the first completely successful Iraqi air attack on that port and the facilities on Kharg Island.

After a rather quiet interval, in late April 1982 there was an Iranian counter-attack which during May again brought the Iranian troops to the shore of the Shatt-el-Arab River despite losses. Subsequently there is a growing Iraqi air superiority and an increase in Iraqi air attacks on Iranian ships off Bandar Khomeiny. This phase intensified in the early days of August. On 10 August, the Greek LITSION BRIDE and the Korean SAMBOW BANNER were sunk by air attacks. Twenty-six of the Greek crew were rescued by Iranian ships.

On 12 August Iraq then declared the northwestern part of the Persian Gulf a closed area, and on 16 August began a pinpoint action against Iran's oil exports from Kharg. By contrast, signs were becoming discernible for a possible Iranian attempt to mine the Strait of Hormuz. But that was quickly and persistently denied by the Iranian Petroleum Ministry. All in all, however, the Iraqi warnings on the transfer of oil at Kharg resulted in the fact that no tankers approached the loading stations for the time being. However, on 25 August the oil loading facilities on Kharg Island were bombarded by Iraqi aircraft in retaliation for Iranian air attacks on populated areas. That attack was then repeated on 30 August, apparently with considerable effect.

One direct consequence of those actions finally was the increase in the insurance rates by Lloyd's of London for all tankers calling at Kharg. This could prove to be a substantial obstacle to Iranian oil exports. Then the Iraqi oil terminal El-Umayeh was bombarded by Iranian aircraft, and finally the direct attempt to cut off Kharg by attacks on tankers and freighters in the closed area was undertaken by Iraqi aircraft. There are conflicting claims on the actual results of those attacks on at least two tankers and two freighters. On the whole, however, the Iranian-Iraqi Gulf war took on a new dimension with those attacks.

The critical development in the Indian Ocean area, however, proved to be three other conflicts.

First, in July 1982, there was again violent fighting between forces of a liberation movement for Somalia and Somali military forces on the Somali borders with Ethiopia. This finally promted the USA to deliver at least part of the promised weapons to Somalia. The material was flown to Somalia from Diego Garcia in a total of 30 flights of C-130s.

On 1 August there was a coup attempt in Kenya by the air force, which was quickly put down, but it brought Kenya's internal and economic problems out into the open.

Finally, on 17 August there was a revolt by part of the army on the Seychelles involving only about 500 men. President Rene managed to maintain control, but signs pointed to the fact that the president could have staged the

coup himself in order to remove ministers not in sympathy with him. Still, a French warship was dispatched from Reunion to Mahe in symbolic support of the president.

This survey of the maritime activities in the Indian Ocean shows that, despite the reduction in the direct tensions between the USA and Iran after the release of the hostages in that area, the interests of the great powers continue to be protected by the employment of maritime power and steps are being taken for an intensified commitment. The instability of the adjoining states, the persistence of the conflict on the Shat-el-Arab River and their possible effects on the oil supply to Europe and Japan, and the continuing Soviet intervention in Afghanistan make this area beside the territory aroud Israel one whose development can be predicted to only a very limited degree at the present, and therefore a very sensitive area. But it can be stated that the maritime presence of the great powers in this area in the aggregate has had rather a stabilizing effect.

REMARKS

1. Escorted by missile cruisers TRUXTUN, SOUTH CAROLINA, and VIRGINIA, missile destroyers MERRILL and O'BRIEN and frigates DAVIDSON, MEYERKORD, BAGLEY, and H. E. HOLT.

2. Including fleet replenishment ships SACRAMENTO, ammunition ships FLINT, and repair ship AJAX.

3. Cover provided by cruiser LEAHY, missile destroyer PARSONS, four frigates (FF-1048, 1067, 1073, and 1087).

4. The Indian Ocean Fleet--The Case and the Cost , by N. L. Stone, in Proceedings, No. 7/1980, p. 54, ff.

5. E.g., AR-6 AJAX from June to December 1980

6. OLWEN, BLUE RIVER, and STROMNESS

7. According to Rivista Militare, No. 12/1980, p. 94, and Warship International, No. 3/1980.

8. RANGER with missile cruiser FOX, missile cruiser GOLDSBOROUGH, and frigates 1070, 1071; MIDWAY with missile cruiser REESES, missile destroyer R. E. BYRD, and frigates 1060, 1064, 1054, 1087).

9. KITTY HAWK with missile cruiser HALSEY, missile destroyer HOEL, destroyers LEFTWICH and CUSHING, frigate 1076, fleet tanker WABASH, and ammunition ship MOUNT HOOD.

10. CONSTELLATION, RANGER, D. D. EISENHOWER, CORAL SEA, INDEPENDENCE.

11. They included 3 MAINE-Class Ro/Ro ships, MERCURY, METEOR, and JUPITER, 2 MARAD C-4 freighters, AMERICAN CHAMPION and AMERICAN COURIER, water tanker ZAPATA PATRIOT with 34,000 t of fresh water and tanker SEALIFT PACIFIC.

12. This includes: 51 M-60AIs, 86 TOW craft, 125 LVTPs, 16 HAWKs, 32 105-mm howitzers, 8 203-mm, 46 60-mm, 7 155-mm (M109), 51 MPFW M-202, 170 other vehicles, 188 REDEYEs, 86 DRAGONs.

13. It included 6 SL-7 fast freighters, container freighter AMERICAN SPITFIRE, Ro/Ro ships REICHENFELS, tankers RANGER, ROVER, and COURIER, and LASH ships AUSTRAL RAINBOW and AUSTRAL LIGHTNING.

14. A sister ship of TEICHENFELD.

15. At 24,600 GRT the largest ferry in the world, converted to more economical power plant for liner service to Finland.

16. LYNESS and TARBATNESS. /55

17. "Soviet Navy Threatens Mideast", by W. J. Ruhe, in Defense Electronics, No. 2/1981, p. 75 ff.

18. Weltgeshen, No. 2/1981; Marine Rundschau, No. 6/1981 and 9/1981; Warship International, No. 3/1980.

19. Warship International, No. 3/1980.

20. The Soviet Navy, Vol. 3, by Ulrich Schulz-Torge, Verlag Wehr und Wissen, Bonn, 1981.

21. Warship International, No. 4/1980, and Rivista Militare and Marine-Rundschau, No. 1/1981, p. 57.

22. The Soviet Navy, Vol. 3, by Ulrich Schulz-Torge.

23. OB at 11,500 t and 150 m in length has about 400 to 500 beds and about 200 medical personnel.

24. According to Marine-Rundschau, No. 6/1981, p. 343, and 9/1981, p. 479.

25. Marine-Rundschau, No. 5/1981.

26. Ships of the World.

27. "Soviet Navy Threatens Mideast" by W. J. Ruhe, in Defense Electronics, No. 2/1981, p. 75 ff.

28. Marine-Rundschau, No. 7/1982.

29. Marine-Rundschau, No. 7/1982.

30. Ibid.

31. "The Strategic World Situation," by Juerg Meister, in Armada International, No. 6/1981, p. 31 f.

32. Loc. cit., p. 32 ff.

33. Loc. cit., p. 34.

34. Statement by US Navy Secretary Lehman of 17 March 1982 (APA).

35. According to Nahost-Orientierung of 7 Jan 1982, Media Analysis Center, Jerusalem.

36. Ibid.

37. See 22.

38. The channels in this strait have widths up to 7.5 km and a maximum depth of 120 m.

39. CANTHO, VINH LONG, VERSEAU, CAPELLA, and CAPRICORNE, with escort LOIRE.

40. Also supply ship ISERE, repair ship JULES VERNE, and minesweepers CEPHEE, BACCARAT, PHENIX, and OUISTREHAM.

41. In addition the missile destroyer PERTH, submarine OTOMA, tanker SUPPLY, and destroyer tender STALWART.

42. See Oesterr. Milit. Zeitschrift/OMZ/, No. 6/1980, p. 461 ff; OMZ, No. 1/1981, p. 44 ff; OMZ, No. 3/1981, p. 239.